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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Court experienced no similar difficulty in the cases of Con.
v. Union Shipbuilding Company, supra., and Coin. v. Hazelwood Savings and Trust Company, supra, where it was
clearly recognized that the exemption extends to only so
much of the capitalstock as represents an investment in the
wholly exempt asset.

The conclusion would seem to be irrestible that a
uniform method of deduction should be employed for
eliminating from the capital stock valuation all non-taxable
and exempt assets.
A motion for reargument is now pending in the case
of Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
supra, and it is to be hoped that it will result either in a

modification of the decision in such manner as will render
it consistent with the principles established in Cont. v.
Union Shipbuilding Company, supra, or else that the Court
will more clearly state why in its opinion a different rule
should apply to the instant case."
Leon D. Metzger

GARAGES AS NUISANCES-Several recent cases
disclose a startling change in the policy of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as to when public garages shall be
deemed to be nuisances per sc. 1 That our law can no longer
be regarded as senseless to the demands of the commercial
world for advances in its favor is evident.

A remarkable

growth in the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court
2
can be noticed in the span of a few months.
The doctrine declared by the cases discussed in a
previous note and reiterated by the most recent ones mentioned above is that a public garage becomes a nuisance
11On September 30, 1929, the Court handed down a modified
opinion as a result of the Commonwealth's motion for re-argument.
Slight changes were made in the original opinion in order to delete
certain erroneous conclusions of fact or misunderstandings on the
part of the Court but the main conclusion was in no way modified
nor was it further supported. The case ofCom. v. Fall Brook Coal
Co., supra, was still considered to be controlling.

'Burke v. Hollinger, 296 Pa. 510 (1929); Burke v. Bassett, 296
Pa. 524 (1929); Ladner v. Siegel, 296 Pa. 579 (1929).
2
See note in 33 Dickinson Law Review 158 (March, 1929).
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per se when conducted in a residential neighborhood., The
rule has lost much of its rigor, however, by the narrowing
of the conception of the residential neighborhoods that are
entitled to the protection of the rule. Two neighborhoods
may be equally residential and one may be entitled to the
benefit of the rule and the other may not be so fortunate.
Burkc v. Hollinger4 discloses that there are at least
three distinct types of residential neighborhoods. In the
first class there will be one-family dwellings, churches,
libraries, an occasional grocery store, and doctors' and
lawyers' offices in homes. The enumeration is doubtless
not exclusive of all other uses but is merely indicative of
the general types present.
In the second type of district, one which is not so
exclusively residential, there may be, in addition to the
uses enumerated above, the following: double-houses,
schools, public or private gardens with their accessory uses.
The cardinal rule in re garages as nuisances is equally applicable to both of these classes. Nothing is to be gained
by treating them as distinct types. They are, nevertheless,
called Class A and Class B.
Class C, the third type district, may of course include
the above named uses and in addition: houses used for
tenements, flats, apartments of any character, hotels,
boarding houses, fraternities, clubs, hospitals and the like.
It is essentially residential but some buildings assume a
commercial aspect.
The Burke case says that all three classes of districts
are entitled to the protection of the public garage rule but
the case creates an exception to the rule. The district in
which a garage was sought to be erected was unquestionably Class C. However, the district bordered or was
located on the fringe of a commercial district. Such a
commercial, district was said to include stores, office buildings, apartment houses, newspaper plants, clubs, financial
buildings but it might exclude anything of an industrial
or manufacturing nature as well as noisy or dirt-making
businesses. Commercial necessity requires the location of
garages in residential districts bordering on such commercial districts. Being so located; the values of real
estate are enhanced thereby. Being so located, it must
bear the inevitable concomitancy of the higher values of
real estate-lessened value of the land as home sites.
3

Ladner v. Siegel, 293 Pa. 306 (1928); Burke v. Hollinger, 296

Pa. 510 (1929).
4296 Pa. 510 (1929).
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The rule in such a residential district located on the
border of a commercial district is that a public garage is
not a nuisance per se but may be shown to be one in fact
by reason of the method of operation.
Burke v. Bassett,, is an identical case.
Those perpetual litigants, Ladner and Siegel, are responsible for the latest case on this subject.6 Having been
denied a declaratory judgment as to what might be done
with his vacant garage located in a residential district,
without violating an injunction against its use as a public
garage, the owner leased a portion of its space for use by
the tenants of the apartment house across the street, the
apartment being owned by the lessee. On being cited for
contempt, the owner argued that it was being used as a
private garage and not a public one. This argument the
lower court did not sustain. The Superior Court did. 7 This
court held that a public garage is a place where the business of storing or rendering service for automobiles for
the public is conducted. The use in the instant case they
held to be private and exclusive as none but the tenants
of the apartment might use it. The Supreme Court held
that the evil against which the rule was directed was the
collection of a number of cars which use a building for
storage, service and the like. The decisions were all said
to be based on the injurious effect of the use of the building on adjoining owners and not at all on who used the
building.
A building used by the owner of a hundred cars for
storage and service would be a public garage under the
rule equally with such a building used by one hundred
owners of a car each. Hence the injunction had been
violated and the contempt decree proper.
But the Court did not stop here. Again looking at
the fact situation in the light of the Burke cases, it held the
district involved to be of the third type, Class C. The
Court said nothing as to the bordering on a commercial
district. It did, however, single out this district as one
which was predominately an apartment house section. Such
districts were said to have lost already much of their exclusive residential value by the erection of the apartment
houses. These erections had been unobjectionable, apparently. Such a district is also not entitled to the full
protection of the public garage rule.
5296 Pa. 524 (1929).
6Ladner v. Siegel, 296 Pa. 579 (1929).
rLadner v. Siegel, 95 Pa. Super. Ct. 328 (1929).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The Court concluded that in such a district a garage
properly built to, under, or around an apartment house is
not a nuisance per se but its use may, from the facts of
operation, become a nuisance. It was also decided that
where two apartments in the same vicinity are joined in
the same ownership, a garage under one building may
serve both, the Court leaving the matter of the use of the
garage by other owners in the immediate vicinity to the
discretion of the court below. The rule as to public garages
remains in full vigor in those districts outside apartment
house influence.
The public garage is a nuisance in residence districts,
Class A and Class B. In Class C, in portions unaffected by
apartment houses, the 'rule is the same. In a Class C
district bordering on a commercial district or affected by
apartment houses the rule now is that a public garage
may be a nuisance in fact but not per se.
The change in policy evidenced by these cases is a
happy one. It might have been wiser to have denied the
operation of the rule in any Class C district. The cases
seem to foreshadow such a rule in the near future if not
a complete abdication of the doctrine.
The latter portion of the Ladner case seems unfortunate. The public garage rule was said to depend not at
all on the ownership of the cars or the building but on
the injurious effect on adjoining owners. Why then is
the Court so careful to limit the discretion of the lower
court to the use of the garage by owners in the immediate
vicinity? If the effect when used by tenants of the surrounding apartment or nearby apartments or by owners
in the immediate vicinity is not injurious to adjoining
owners, how can it be injurious if used by owners who
do not live in the immediate vicinity? Manner of operation is to be the test regardless of the domicil of the users,
be it near or far. This the Court seems to have forgotten.
Harold S. Irwin

CONSTITUTIONALITY BY LONG ACQUIESCENCE
AND TACIT ASSUMPTION-An interesting field of speculation is opened to the -inquiring mind by the reasoning
of the courts on the weight to be given to a contemporaneous or practical construction of the constitution by an
agency other than the court which has charged itself with
final jurisdiction of constitutional questions. It frequently

